INTRODUCTION
The present 'unwritten constitution' is an anachronism riddled with references to our ancient past, unsuited to the social and political democracy of the 21st century and future aspirations of its people. It fails to give primacy to the sovereignty of the people and discourages popular participation in the political process.
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Written constitutions have played a significant-if not a pre-eminent-role in the establishment of democracy and the continuation of democratic rights and principles…or so the story goes. And the United Kingdom, with its unwritten constitution, historic monarchy and 'untenable' principle of parliamentary sovereignty, 2 is the perfect example of a nation stuck in the past, unable to transform 1779. 10 Additionally, an argument can be made that such historical contextual acknowledgement is the most important-and indeed, the most celebrated-part of the USA's antiquated Constitution. 11 Thus a criticism such as this seems unwarranted, or entirely misplaced. Further, the clause 'unsuited to the…future aspirations of its people' also connects to the discouragement of 'popular participation in the political process'.
As is evidenced below, declarations of aspirations and ambitions-which are often present in preambles and bills of rights-often have been associated with 'invigorating'
or 'inspiring' the populace A further invigoration method is constitutional acknowledgement that 'the people' are sovereign. The current UK constitution does not guarantee this, and such a sovereignty 'failing' appears to be an especially significant factor in discouraging political participation. Taken altogether, the complementary statements imply that if the United Kingdom had a 'modern' constitution that included state aspirations and which provided ultimate sovereignty to the people, then popular participation in the democratic process would be encouraged. This is a bold, and unsubstantiated, claim.
This article questions whether constitutions and bills of rights are indeed the invigorating, democracy-reinforcing mechanisms they are frequently portrayed as.
Although such esteemed democratic 'necessities' provide citizens with a national symbol, the entrenchment of rights and perhaps a minimal understanding of governmental relationships, this piece argues that they do not 'invigorate' polities in the manner that constitutional theorists and others have suggested. It is primarily concerned with one main issue regarding such revered texts: whether new constitutions and bills of rights (including major constitutional amendments) serve to invigorate democracies, thus leading to higher democratic participation (i.e., higher voting levels). After all, if the claims that constitutions and bills of rights are inspiring, value-laden, and aspirational documents capable of empowering citizens with ultimate sovereignty, then it is fitting to connect such claims with democratic performance. It is certainly acknowledged, however, that democratic participation-especially today-goes beyond voting, and can manifest in social movements, public consultations, or digital engagement (eg, e-petitions), among other things. Arguments could be put forward that some of these developments may be more important than voting, and could have more of an impact on a state's constitutional politics. Nevertheless, the connection between constitutions, bills of rights, and voting is important, and requires further investigation.
The article proceeds as follows. First, the connection between constitutions, bills of rights, and democracy is discussed, and evidence is presented that many scholars connect such documents not only to a healthy political system and increased democratic 10 French Constitution, Preamble, para. 1. 11 See, eg, T Ginsburg and AZ Huq, 'Assessing Constitutional Performance', in T Ginsburg and AZ Huq, Assessing Constitutional Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) pp 23-26. participation, but also to 'inspiring' or invigorating the populous. The following section discusses the practical aspects surrounding constitutions and voter turnout, stressing that measuring this relationship is an inherently difficult process. It also further justifies why the relationship is important, and should be studied within the UK and elsewhere.
The Methods section provides the hypotheses and explains how the empirical analysis was conducted. The following three sections primarily use case studies to demonstrate the effects of implementing constitutions, bills of rights, and constitutional amendments on voter turnout. The final section discusses some of the implications of this provisional study, and calls for more research into this area of constitutional assessment. It concludes that although constitutions and bills of rights often appear to be democracyreinforcing mechanisms, ultimately-and surprisingly in some cases-they could also contain democracy-hindering downsides.
CONSTITUTIONS, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY
Constitutions are essentially the "Dummy's Guide" to understanding state operation:
they may reveal some essential features, but one will hardly understand state processes through consulting them. Nevertheless, they are widely considered the first port of call for comparative legal scholars and are said to contain the fundamental law essential to the establishment and operation of states. Constitutional theorists have laid out a number of functions that constitutions serve, including: setting forth constitutional values, entrenching constitutional rights, conferring and limiting powers of government, delineating the structure and operations of the state 12 and even generating endless democratic debate. 13 These functions have been extensively written about and indeed are endlessly debated. And yet, constitutions would be relatively dull devices if they possessed only legal significance.
Although debate over constitutional success or failure has been a long-running strand of academic investigation, only recently has "constitutional performance"
become a more sophisticated sub-topic of constitutional theory. 20 concluding that modern constitutional texts are 'performative', in the sense that 'they perform an action, rather than only describe an event or make a statement'. 21 Loughlin recently noted this, emphasising 'the manner in which constitutions can harness the power of narrative, symbol, ritual and myth to project an account of political existence in ways that shape -and re-shape -political reality'. 22 Although some may challenge the statistical evaluation of constitutional success, 23 this article aligns with and expands on the empirical aspects of constitutional performance, testing the relationship between new constitutions, bills of rights, and constitutional amendments with voter turnout.
This renewed focus on constitutional performance has on many occasions touched on the relationship between constitutions and voter turnout. Dixon and Landau state that '[a] central function of a written constitution is to enhance the stability of the political system', and that a competitive democracy requires this 'minimum core of a democratic constitution' to endure if a constitution is to be successful, emphasising the democratic vote. 24 Hardin also argues that constitutions can (or should) provide for the successful coordination of society and politics. 25 Ginsburg and Huq take these arguments further, stressing that 'in democratic contexts, [constitutions] can also help facilitate participatory politics', and that '[f]idelity to the constitution provides a normative justification for democratic participation'. 26 These statements appear similar to the Commons Committee statement at the beginning of this article.
Claims regarding additional 'constitutional possibilities' can make such texts appear powerfully tempting: Blackburn has claimed that such a document may 'bring government and the governed closer together', 27 and could 'strengthen public confidence and trust in the political system' by better educating citizens. 28 Given that modern constitutions are cloaked in values and aspirations, King maintains that constitutions can be viewed as 'mission statements'. 29 Recent focus on including citizens in the drafting process has demonstrated a number of benefits, such as decreased state violence, 30 stronger citizen constitutional attachment, 31 even a longer constitutional lifespan. 32 Further, the narrative component, which may incorporate a nation's history, can sometimes act as 'a source of inspiration' for citizens. 33 Landemore notes that great constitutions include such 'inspirational' features, including that they are 'beautifully written and likely to generate emotions such as love and admiration among its own people and beyond, among current and future generations'. 34 Ultimately, the notion that there may be something 'sacred or irrational' in the very 'nature of constitutions' 35 is a long-held belief that much constitutional scholarship has perpetuated.
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A popular performative mechanism located within constitutions is preambles, which as an expressive component can 'narrate the nation's past and envision its future'. 37 King has noted that such devices can provide 'normative guidance and the institutional declaration of key variables', 38 while Levinson states that they express 'the ostensible "essence" of the people or nation', and on occasion can be 'inspiring'. 39 Even though the 'justiciability' of preambles within states remains relatively low, it is the expressive elements of these intriguing devices that scholars-and indeed many countries-have found so empowering, and therefore so useful. Much of the rhetoric on bills of rights speaks of legal empowerment, especially the power to take rights claims before the courts. And yet, further claims have been made in terms of citizen empowerment, sovereignty, and potential democratic effects.
Aspirations have long been explicitly connected to rights; after all, the codification of human rights is 'a movement which answers the aspirations of peoples and takes its origins from the aspirations of peoples'. 62 Levinson asserts that when it comes to constitutional concerns about political structure, people '[t]oo often…tend to yawn at discussions of such issues', and often 'become animated only when discussion turns'
to rights, such as speech, religion or private property. 63 Some have asserted an explicit connection between sovereignty and rights. Ackerman, for instance, notes that in America it 'is the People who are the source of rights'. Learning about these principles would become part of the school curriculum and adult education, encouraging pupils and students to debate the importance of protecting human rights and the difficulties which arise when they conflict.
Such a development would encourage a more informed public, more sensitive to the implications of restricting civil liberties and of extending them.
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But such an idealistic argument appears woefully naive, and there is no empirical evidence that citizens of states incorporating a bill of rights are any more knowledgeable or informed than citizens of states without such devices. The symbolic elements of bills of rights have also been acknowledged, given that for 'the great mass of people, the chief significance of a Bill of Rights is less a tool of legal litigation than as a symbolic political declaration of what their civil rights and freedoms are or should be'. 69 Thus both constitutions and bills of rights have had a wide range of claims attached to them, and many such assertions suggest that democracies-one way or another-will be invigorated by such documents.
CONSTITUTIONS AND VOTER TURNOUT: A PROVISIONAL INQUIRY
Constitutionalism without social science is an arid intellectual pastime. 
METHODS
To begin we should at least follow the inclination flowing from much of the constitutional scholarship: that newly enacted constitutions or bills of rights are democracy-reinforcing, and indeed can be invigorating or inspiring. If this logic is followed, two hypotheses can be put forward:
Hypothesis No 1:
Newly enacted constitutions  higher voter turnout (especially in the short term)
Hypothesis No 2:
Newly Italy, and Japan were also eliminated from the analysis. Unfortunately, the below analysis is also unable to study the implementation of written constitutions, as opposed to just new constitutions. Although this may be an important distinction, as the UK could be moving from an unwritten to a written constitution-not merely from one written constitution to the next-the availability of the data do not support such a project going forward. Also, there are good reasons to think that the distinction between the two are marginal or even insignificant; newly implemented constitutions, even in states that already had a written constitution, often require a high level of political support (either by an elite group of drafters or framers, or even at times by the citizens), in order to move forward. If this support is not present, then any constitution in question is unlikely to be adopted.
In this provisional study, general election voting results were analysed before and directly after a constitution or bill of rights was passed in a given jurisdiction. This allowed me to analyse whether a new constitution or bill of rights may have had any immediate effect on the voting outcomes of the accompanying jurisdictions. 102 The length of time between constitutional implementation and the next general election was also taken into consideration, as the shorter amount of time between these events, the better for my analysis. It is important to note here that the claims made about constitutions from the Commons Committee-and more widely, the constitutional claims noted above by other scholars as regards potential effects-were primarily wholesale, in the sense that there was little nuance or qualification; nor did they supply any empirical evidence for their backing. Thus I have attempted to provisionally test such claims using raw voting data, and without employing sophisticated statistical methods. I acknowledge that some may dismiss these methods, but as noted above, this piece is provisional in nature, and is primarily looking to challenge these constitutional claims that currently have no empirical backing. 101 Although it is acknowledged that some of the examples under the main case studies have come from countries making a fundamental political transition. 102 There may be a strong argument that one should look at the long-term effects of new constitutions and their effects on voting participation. While I do hope to eventually take this into consideration, a project of such magnitude is outside the scope of this paper.
Although such positive claims about constitutions may sound logical and reasonable (e.g., that constitutions would improve democratic participation or better educate citizens), as scholars we cannot rely on logic alone. After all, it was once believed that the world was flat, that the body was made of four humours, and that lobotomies were a viable method to treat mental illness and criminality. Perhaps in the near future scholars will be able to assemble a model that can isolate the impact of constitutions, bills of rights, or major constitutional amendments that may further expand on this study. I fully support, and even encourage, such a project. But the reality-as any scholar that has undertaken such research or has taken the time to learn or study statistics-is that in any such model there will be deficiencies and unknown variables that the model will be unable to capture, and we will be left arguing about what was in the models and how those variables were weighted, rather than the discussing the importance of the claims themselves. Voter turnout, after all, is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that political scientists are still attempting to understand.
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Nevertheless, the sections below provide provisional evidence that more research is needed in this important area of constitutional theory.
NEW CONSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
A prominent example of how a new constitution could potentially affect voting is The timeline for France's 1958 Constitution was ideal for this study. to increase voter turnout. Although bills of rights are common in newly enacted constitutions, enactments on their own do not occur as frequently. Thus, there were fewer data to analyse as regards these documents. The section begins with a case study on the HRA 1998, and then moves to other examples.
Case study: The Human Rights Act 1998
Both when it was proposed 118 and after its enactment, the HRA 1998 has predominantly been viewed as a 'bill of rights' for the United Kingdom, and to a large extent-both by the legal and political establishment-it has been treated as such. 119 Although passed in 1998, the measure did not fully come into force until 2000. Given that there was a general election in 1997 and another in 2001, this supplies ideal evidence in terms of examining the potential effects on UK voter turnout both before the HRA and after its implementation.
But such an analysis must be put into context. The general election in 1997 was a sweeping victory that brought into power Tony Blair and New Labour. The election was characterised as a case of low voter turnout, given that up to that point turnout was the lowest in the post-war period, at 71.46 per cent. 120 However given the 1983 general election turnout (72.81 per cent), it could not have been too shocking. Even though no structural changes to the voting mechanisms in Britain had taken place (as there was in 1970, when the voting age was changed from 21 to 18), 121 Labour was 'widely anticipated' to win the election. 122 Thus the 1997 voting turnout figures, after almost two decades of Conservative leadership, were hardly surprising. already had autonomous political independence from Britain, the 1982 Act thus completed the patriation of independence to Canadian citizens. The Act also entrenched civil rights within Canada's supreme law, and gave the judiciary the power to strike down laws inconsistent with the Charter. 141 The passage of two significant constitutional statutes, which provided full patriation and the entrenchment of newly established rights, could have propelled Canadian citizens to turnout in higher numbers.
In reality, however, the spike in voter turnout could be a distortion, as the low 1980
voter turnout was probably due to the previous election being held just nine months before. Scholars have also noted that higher rates of women were running for election to parliament during the 1984 election, 142 and that there was an 'unprecedented' change to media coverage of opinion polls that year, 143 two factors that may have influenced voter turnout. However, regardless of whether we consider these factors, it is difficult to claim that the Charter 'invigorated' Canada's democracy, as the 1984 election merely brought election turnout close to where it was for the 1979 election.
PLACATING, NOT INVIGORATING, DEMOCRACY
The 'traditional' or 'intuitive' argument that constitutions and bills of rights invigorate democracy through enhanced political participation has been challenged. Raw empirical voting data from a number of prominent case studies has provided provisional evidence that the Commons Report's overly simplistic understanding of the (perceived) effects of such devices does not hold, as in many cases voter participation decreased after implementation; thus, perhaps, placating-rather than invigorating-democracies.
Therefore tendentious positive claims that constitutions and bills of rights can be inspiring, hold sacred value for citizens, and especially that they can 'increase participation in the political process' may need to be significantly re-evaluated and balanced with the recognition that such devices are not as powerful as previously thought.
The reason that some jurisdictions have seen a drop in electoral turnout after implementation is unclear, and it would be irresponsible to attribute the decreases solely to the implementation of constitutions, bills of rights, or constitutional amendments.
Voting turnout is a multifaceted phenomenon impacted by a number of complicated factors (eg, interest in politics, perceived value of voting, political disenchantment, etc. Nevertheless, the decreases found in many of the cases above cannot be ignored.
Perhaps one explanation of such drops could be a reflection of what Pitkin and others have identified: that constitution making is a highly political process that involves intense power struggles. 144 Such high-level political tussles could ultimately discourage democratic participation, rather than enhancing it. Additionally, decrease in participation in some instances may be due to citizen placation or complacency: after the implementation of a constitution or bill of rights citizens may feel as if their states are in good working order, and thus feel less need to go to the polls. This could potentially explain the instances noted above-perhaps even after the HRA 1998-in which constitutional or bill of rights implementation produced the lowest-ever state voter turnout levels.
The issue of citizen sovereignty also needs to be addressed here. New constitutions and bills of rights are widely framed as 'we the people' documents that will increase citizen power, providing them a form of citizen rule through popular sovereignty. Given democracies, then voting turnout is a realistic and justified measurement of constitutional contentment. And yet, in some cases after the enactment of new constitutions, bills of rights or major constitutional amendments-for whatever reason-states experienced a decline in voter turnout; such was the case in the UK after implementation of the HRA 1998, and the UK still has not climbed back to its pre-HRA voter turnout levels. 147 This finding leads to the conclusion that while constitutions and bills of rights may serve larger goals as regards organising the state and protecting fundamental rights, they could also contain democracy-hindering downsides-or, at the very least, may not be as politically powerful or inspiring as once thought. Whatever the implications of the above empirical data, there remains little doubt that more research is necessary into the connection between constitutions and democratic performance, such as voting.
The consequences of such constitutional placation are important for democracy. The more that citizens feel a sense of placation or complacency about their constitutional settlements, two significant results may occur: 1) citizens will be less likely to be the watchful eye or critical voice that democratic states require; and 2) when citizens are less engaged with their democratic functions (i.e., through voting), unelected actors within a state-such as the judiciary-become much more powerful, 148 thus diminishing citizen control. As citizens we must concede both the positives and negatives that constitutions and bills of rights offer. In many situations democracy may be placated, not invigorated, through the enactment of such texts.
